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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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The GAO’s 11th Annual Assessment of Selected Weapon 
Programs 
Michael J. Sullivan—Sullivan is the director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. This group has responsibility for examining the effectiveness of the 
DoD’s acquisition and procurement practices in meeting its mission performance objectives and 
requirements. In addition to directing reviews of major weapon system acquisitions such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, F-22, Global Hawk, and various other major weapon acquisition programs, Sullivan 
has developed and directs a body of work examining how the DoD can apply best practices to the 
nation’s largest and most technically advanced weapon systems acquisition system. This work has 
spanned a broad range of issues critical to the successful delivery of systems, including technology 
development, product development, transition to production, software development, program 
management, requirement-setting, cost estimating, and strategic portfolio management. The findings 
and recommendations from this work have played a major role in the department’s recent acquisition 
policy revisions. Most recently, he has directed the GAO’s annual assessment of major weapon 
systems programs for the Congress and GAO’s work with Congress in establishing acquisition policy 
reforms. His team also provides the Congress with early warning on technical and management 
challenges facing these investments. Sullivan has been with the GAO for 24 years. He received a 
bachelor's degree in political science from Indiana University and a master’s degree in public 
administration from the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. 
[sullivanm@gao.gov] 
Abstract 
This paper reflects the GAO’s observations on how well the DoD is planning and executing its 
$1.602 trillion portfolio of major weapon programs. Although the total projected cost of the 
portfolio remains significant, that cost has declined since peaking at $1.75 trillion in 2010 and 
is currently at its lowest point in over five years. In addition, the number of programs in the 
portfolio has decreased from 98 programs in 2010 to 86 programs in 2012. DoD weapon 
system acquisition represents one of the largest areas of the government’s discretionary 
spending. With the likelihood of decreased defense budgets looming in the near future, it is 
imperative that the DoD continue to find ways to reduce cost and improve efficiency. 
Introduction 
This paper reflects the GAO’s observations on how well the DoD is planning and 
executing its $1.602 trillion portfolio of major weapon programs. Although the total projected 
cost of the portfolio remains significant, that cost has declined since peaking at $1.75 trillion 
in 2010 and is currently at its lowest point in over five years. In addition, the number of 
programs in the portfolio has decreased from 98 programs in 2010 to 86 programs in 2012. 
DoD weapon system acquisition—an area that has been on the GAO’s high-risk list for more 
than 20 years—still represents one of the largest areas of the government’s discretionary 
spending. Over the past decade, Congress and the DoD have made meaningful 
improvements in the statutory and policy frameworks that govern weapon system 
acquisitions by mandating and encouraging a more knowledge-based approach to the 
development and production of major systems. The GAO has noted in the past that practice 
has lagged behind policy in certain areas, and commensurate improvements in program 
outcomes have not been evident. However, the changes in the DoD’s portfolio over the past 
few years indicate that some improvements are being realized. With the likelihood of 
decreased defense budgets looming in the near future, it is imperative that the DoD continue 
to find ways to reduce cost and improve efficiency. 
The following are observations on (1) the cost and schedule performance of the 
DoD’s 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs, including the Missile 
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Defense Agency’s (MDA’s) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); (2) the knowledge 
attained at key junctures in the acquisition process for 40 weapon programs in development 
or early production; and (3) key acquisition reform initiatives and program concurrency.1 For 
a more detailed discussion of each of the observations, see GAO-13-294SP (GAO, 2013). 
Data from three sets of programs provided the basis for the observations: 
 We assessed all 86 major defense acquisition programs in the DoD’s 2012 
portfolio for our analysis of cost and schedule performance. To develop our 
observations, we obtained cost, schedule, and quantity data from the DoD’s 
December 2011 Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) and from the Defense 
Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Purview system. In order to 
fully reflect the total size and cost of the DoD’s portfolio, we included the cost 
of BMDS—as of DoD’s fiscal year 2013 budget submission—in this year’s 
assessment of the changes in the overall cost and size of the portfolio over 
the past year. However, the program was excluded from the remainder of our 
analyses because no acquisition program baseline exists.   
 We assessed 40 MDAPs that were mostly between the start of development 
and full-rate production for our analysis of knowledge attained at key 
junctures and the implementation of acquisition reforms. To develop our 
observations, we obtained information on the extent to which the programs 
follow knowledge-based practices for technology maturity, design stability, 
and production maturity using a data-collection instrument. We also 
submitted a survey to program offices to collect information on systems 
engineering reviews, design stability, manufacturing planning and execution, 
and the implementation of specific acquisition reforms. We received survey 
responses from all of the programs from August to November 2012. 
 In addition, we assessed 17 future major defense acquisition programs in 
order to gain additional insights into the implementation of key acquisition 
reform initiatives. To develop our observations, we submitted a survey to 
program offices to collect information on program schedule events, costs, and 
numerous acquisition reforms, and received responses from all 17 future 
programs from August to October 2012. 
Observations on the Performance of the DoD’s 2012 Major Defense Acquisition 
Program Portfolio 
The overall size and estimated cost of the DoD’s portfolio of MDAPs decreased over 
the past year, while the average time to deliver initial capability to the warfighter increased 
by one month. Our analysis of the DoD’s 2012 portfolio allows us to make the following nine 
observations. 
1. The DoD’s 2012 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs contains 86 
programs with a combined total estimated cost of $1.602 trillion, which is a 
                                                
1 Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by the DoD that require eventual total 
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures, including all planned increments, 
of more than $365 million, or procurement expenditures, including all planned increments, of more 
than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. The DoD has a list of programs designated as 
pre–major defense acquisition programs (pre-MDAP). These programs have not formally been 
designated as MDAPs; however, the DoD plans for these programs to enter system development, or 
bypass development and begin production, at which point they will likely be designated as MDAPs. 
We refer to these programs as future major defense acquisition programs throughout this report. 
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reduction of 10 programs and more than $152 billion from 2011 levels. This 
represents the smallest portfolio in more than five years.2 
2. The total estimated acquisition cost of the 86 programs in the 2012 portfolio 
decreased by $44 billion over the past year while the delivery of initial 
operating capability slipped by one month on average.3 When assessed 
against first full estimates, the total cost of the portfolio has increased by over 
$400 billion, including more than $90 billion in development cost growth and 
nearly $290 billion in procurement cost growth, with an average delay of 27 
months in the delivery of initial operating capability.4 
3. Program cancelations and restructurings account for nearly all of the cost 
reduction over the past year. 
4. Long-term progress of the Missile Defense Agency’s $133 billion BMDS 
cannot be assessed because insight into future program costs is limited to 
the five years covered by the budget, and the program was not required to 
establish an acquisition program baseline when it began. 
5. More than 60% of the programs in the 2012 portfolio increased buying power 
over the past year—as measured by a decrease in program acquisition unit 
cost—a notable improvement when compared to last year, when more than 
60% of the programs in the portfolio lost buying power. 
6. When measured against cost growth targets discussed by the DoD, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the GAO, the portfolio’s 
performance has improved. Only 15% of programs exceeded the one-year 
target—down from 40% last year—and smaller percentages of programs 
exceeded targets for growth both in the past five years and since first full 
estimates. 
7. Eight of the 10 costliest programs in the DoD’s portfolio, excluding BMDS, 
reported cost reductions over the past year totaling nearly $5 billion—about 
10% of the portfolio’s total cost reduction.  
8. The DoD has invested more than $805 billion in its 2012 portfolio, leaving 
over $660 billion remaining to be funded, excluding BMDS. More than 90% of 
the remaining funding is for procurement, with more than 60% of that amount 
associated with the 10 costliest programs in the portfolio, most prominently 
the Joint Strike Fighter. 
9. Around 40% of the funding needed to complete the programs in the portfolio 
represents cost growth since first full estimates. 
Observations on Knowledge Attained by Programs at Key Acquisition Junctures 
Our 2013 assessment continues to demonstrate both progress and a significant 
need for programs to better follow a knowledge-based approach, reducing gaps in 
technology, design, and production knowledge. Knowledge in these three areas builds over 
                                                
2 All dollar figures are in fiscal year 2013 constant dollars, unless otherwise noted.  
3 In addition to research and development and procurement costs, total acquisition cost includes 
acquisition-related operation and maintenance and system-specific military construction costs. 
4 Our discussion of cost growth since first full estimates does not include the BMDS, as the program 
was not required to establish an acquisition program baseline when it began (see GAO, 2012a, for an 
assessment of the Missile Defense Agency’s cost, testing, and performance progress in developing 
the system). 
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time—a knowledge deficit early in a program can cascade through design and production, 
leaving decision-makers with less knowledge to support decisions about when and how best 
to move into subsequent acquisition phases that commit more budgetary resources. A 
knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in which certain knowledge 
is acquired by key decision points before proceeding. Demonstrating technology maturity is 
a prerequisite for moving forward into system development, during which the focus should 
be on design and integration. A stable and mature design is likewise a prerequisite for 
moving forward into production where the focus should be on efficient manufacturing. We 
assessed the knowledge attained at key junctures in the acquisition process for 40 individual 
weapon programs, which are mostly in development or early production.5 Not all programs 
included in our assessment of knowledge-based practices provided information for every 
knowledge point or had reached all of the knowledge points—development start, design 
review, and production start—at the time of our review. Our analysis allows us to make the 
following three observations: 
1. Many of the programs that began in the last five years had mature 
technologies and held a preliminary design review prior to the start of 
development (knowledge point 1), providing a better foundation to avoid 
future cost and schedule problems. 
2. Less than one third of the programs that provided data on design drawings 
released actually reported having a stable design at their critical design 
review (knowledge point 2), and the use of other knowledge-based practices 
to ensure design stability at this critical juncture varied.  
3. Many of the programs we assessed have taken or plan to take steps to 
capture critical manufacturing knowledge prior to the start of production 
(knowledge point 3), although the methods used varied. 
Observations on Implementation of Acquisition Reform Initiatives and Program 
Concurrency 
Over the past several years, Congress and the DoD have instituted multiple 
initiatives aimed at improving the way the department does business by driving down 
acquisition costs and ensuring that programs are more affordable: specifically the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the reissuance of DoD Instruction 5000.02 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2008), and multiple “Better Buying Power” memorandums issued by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L], 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012).   We analyzed survey data collected from 40 current major 
defense acquisition programs—the same programs reflected in our knowledge point 
analysis—and 17 programs identified by the DoD as future major defense acquisition 
programs, regarding the implementation of key aspects of these reform initiatives. We 
focused our analysis on the aspects of the DoD’s “Better Buying Power” initiatives and the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 aimed at ensuring program and portfolio 
affordability, controlling cost growth, and promoting competition throughout the acquisition 
life-cycle.6 In addition, we assessed the amount of concurrency between developmental 
                                                
5 Because knowledge points and best practices differ for shipbuilding programs, we exclude the six 
shipbuilding programs from some of our analysis related to knowledge point 2 and knowledge point 3. 
6 In December 2012, we reported on the DoD’s implementation of the Weapon System Acquisition 
Reform Act of 2009 and noted that the DoD had taken steps to implement fundamental provisions of 
the Act, and that the DoD was taking additional steps to further strengthen its policies and acquisition 
capabilities. We also reported, however, that the DoD still faced organizational, policy, and cultural 
challenges to implementing acquisition reform (GAO, 2012b). 
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testing and production for those current programs beyond knowledge point 3.7 We have 
consistently emphasized the importance of completing developmental testing before 
entering production and have pointed out the increased risks associated with concurrent 
testing and production. Our analysis allows us to make the following five observations: 
1. The implementation of several key initiatives in the Weapon System 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 aimed at increasing program knowledge at 
development start varied among the future major defense acquisition 
programs we surveyed. 
2. Around half of the current and future programs we assessed have 
established affordability requirements, and many are meeting those 
requirements.  
3. Almost 90% of the current MDAPs we assessed have conducted “should 
cost” analysis, and most of those programs noted that they had realized or 
expected to realize cost savings as a result. 
4. Although the DoD recognizes the need for and benefits of competition in 
weapon system acquisitions, and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009 requires programs to have competitive acquisition strategies, 
many of the programs we assessed did not have such strategies in place. 
5. Nearly 80% of the programs we surveyed that were in production reported 
that 30% or more of their developmental testing had been or was going to be 
done during production, despite the increased risk that design changes and 
costly retrofits will need to be made. 
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